We analyze data from the second-price maximum-value auction experiment reported in Ivanov, Levin and Niederle (2010) in order to investigate the extent to which the winner's curse can be explained by quantal response, in combination with diffferent assumptions about equilibrium (QRE) or nonequilibrium beliefs (QCH or QCE). We find a close correspondence between the theoretical predictions of those models and experimental behavior, even in the presence of frequent (and extreme) overbidding.
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Introduction
This paper discusses experimental evidence of bidding in a maximum-value auction game. In these game, two bidders draw uniformly-distributed, independent, integer-valued private signals from the set {0, 1, . . . , 10}. The common value of the auctioned object is the maximum of the two signals. The two bidders make simultaneous bids in a second-price auction. The highest bidder wins the object and pays the second-highest price. Ties are broken randomly.
The maximum-value auction has some interesting properties for testing theories of behavior in games. There is a unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in which bidders bid their signals. However, the equilibrium is weak because overbidding against signal-bidding is also a best response. Therefore, regular quantal response equilibria (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey (2005) ) will typically entail a substantial frequency of overbidding.
Ivanov, Levin and Niederle (2010b) (ILN) conducted experiments on this maximum-value auction game. They also conducted two different experimental treatments: in one treatment (MinBid ) bids cannot be lower than private signals; in the other treatment (phase II ), subjects bid against their own previous bids from a phase I auction against other people.
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These are the two main results: first, there is substantial overbidding; the median bids in phase I of the experiment range monotonically from about $5 to $10 for corresponding signal values from $0 to $10. Second, bids do not change very much between the phase I auctions and the MinBid and phase II treatments.
We show that these two empirical results are consistent with both quantal response equilibrium (QRE) and with two theories in which strategic thinking is limited, cursed equilibrium (CE) and cognitive hierarchy (CH, similar to level-k), when quantal response is also assumed.
These results do not arise because 'quantal response can fit anything', a claim that is not generally true for regular quantal response equilibria including the most common logit and power specifications (Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2005) . 2 Instead, the phase I data are first used to derive parameters which fit those data best using maximum likelihood estimation. Then the phase II bidding results are forecasted using those same parameters derived from fitting phase I. 3 Phase II bids forecasted out-of-sample and phase I bids fitted in-sample are predicted to be very similar (actually, predicted bids are slightly lower in phase II)-that is, the treatment effects predicted based on the phase I behavior are very small. And in fact, the empirical bid functions are also very similar. We also compute out of sample forecasts for the MinBid treatment, with similar results. Thus, the pattern of bids in the initial phase I auctions and the empirical (non-)response to the MinBid and phase II auctions can be empirically explained by QRE, and can be explained somewhat more accurately by quantal response versions of the CE and CH models.
The Winner's Curse
The impetus for ILN's paper is to further understand the winner's curse (WC). The winner's curse results when bidders bid too high a fraction of a private value estimate, in common-value auctions, leading them to overpay (relative to equilibrium bidding) and even lose money. The winner's curse is one of the most interesting and best-documented facts in empirical auction analysis (Kagel and Levin (1986) , Dyer, Kagel and Levin (1989) , Levin, Kagel and Richard (1996) , Kagel and Levin (2002) ). The fundamental explanation for the observed overbidding has, surprisingly, proved to be elusive.
A likely cause contributing to overbidding is the failure of agents to appreciate the relation between the bids of other agents and those agents' perceived value of the auctioned good. This mistake is the motivation for the concept of "cursed equilibrium" (Eyster and Rabin (2005); CE) and similar limits on rationality which motivate analogy-based expectation equilibrium (Jehiel (2005) , Jehiel and Koessler (2008) ).
Another possible cause is that agents simply find it conceptually difficult to compute a conditional expectation of value of any sort. If the difficulty of this computation is the main source of the winner's curse, the same mistake should also occur in a single-person decision where there is no other player or strategic uncertainty, but there is identical conditional expectation. Indeed, an early control experiment to the "Acquire-a-company" game conducted by psychologists showed that failures to adjust for adverse selection do also occur reliably in an individual-decision isomorph of that game (the "beastie run"; see Carroll, Bazerman and Maury (1988) ). This fact became well known in decision research in the late 1980s and was frequently discussed in that literature (see recently Tor and Bazerman (2003) , who show the relationship to imperfect updating in the Monty Hall 3-door decision problem). Charness and Levin (2009) report evidence from a similar decision experiment, replicating these earlier findings in psychology that winner's curse-like effects are also present in individual decision problems.
What about strategic models of the winner's curse? Besides CE, a class of non-equilibrium models, introduced in behavioral game theory around 1995, which have been applied to many types of games, allow players' beliefs about the likely actions of others to be mistaken. One such model, mentioned above, is cursed equilibrium. Another class of models include "levelk" and "cognitive hierarchy" (CH) specifications of beliefs. 4 Both models start with some clearly specified level-0 play (which is typically assumed to be random and uniform, but could more generally be considered instinctive (Rubinstein, 2007) , focal based on salience (Crawford and Irriberri, 2007; Milosavljevic, Smith, Koch and Camerer, 2010).
Level-1 players assume they are playing level-0 players. 5 An iterated hierarchy then follows, most typically in two different ways: in "level-k" models level-k players (for k ≥ 1) believe their opponents are all using level k − 1 reasoning. In cognitive hierarchy (CH) models level-k players believe opponents are using a mixture of level 0, 1, . . . , k − 1 reasoning; their normalized beliefs therefore approach equilibrium beliefs as k increases.
The simplest forms of these models assume players choose best responses given their beliefs. Indeed, ILN use the term "belief-based models" to refer exclusively to models with nonequilibrium beliefs and best response. Table 1 shows how different assumptions about accuracy of beliefs, and best response, can be combined more generally in different theories of strategic choice. In terms of this table, ILN use the phrase "belief-based models"to mean "best response models with nonequilibrium beliefs"(the lower left cell). Table 1 also gives a count of the number of empirical papers analyzing nonequilibrium beliefs models which assume best-response (there are 24) and the number which assume quantal response (there are 37). 6 The counts indicate that a majority of studies of nonequilibrium beliefs assume quantal response. Thus, the models ILN call "belief based models", and reject in discussion of their data, are not those most commonly used in empirical practice.
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This fact about model popularity, and the existence of the different combinations illustrated in Table 1 , suggests two interesting empirical questions left unexplored by ILN: first, can an equilibrium quantal response model (QRE) fit the data? ILN conjecture (2010a) that "our evidence... is probably also evidence against QRE." We explore this conjecture further. Second, can quantal response forms of nonequilibrium belief models explain the data, and especially the empirical absence of treatment effects? We address this question by estimating quantal response versions of both CE and CH models. 
The Maximum Value Game
In the maximum-value auction of ILN, two players observe private signals x 1 and x 2 drawn independently from a uniform distribution over the set of integers, {0, 1, ..., 10}. They bid for an object which has a common value equal to the maximum of those two signals, max(x 1 , x 2 ). The highest bidder wins the auction and pays a price equal to the second-highest bid. 8 .
How should you bid? Intuitively, if your own value is high you might underbid to save some money. And if your own value is low you might overbid because the object value, determined by the maximum of the two values, is likely to be higher than your low value.
These intuitions are not consistent with equilibrium, however. Bidding less than your signal is a mistake because your bid just determines whether you win, not what you pay, so bidding less never saves money. In fact, you might miss a chance to win at a price below its value if you bid too low and get outbid, so underbidding is weakly dominated. Second, bidding above your signal could be a mistake because if the other bidder is also overbidding, either of you may get stuck overpaying for an item with a low maximum-value. In the unique symmetric Bayesian-Nash equilibrium, therefore, players simply bid their values. In fact, the equilibrium can be solved for with two rounds of elimination of weakly dominated strategies.
While these bidding intuitions are mistakes, they can be small mistakes in terms of expected foregone payoffs. Moreover, payoff functions have many completely flat regions, so it turns out that some 'mistakes' of overbidding actually have zero expected cost in equilibrium. Whether mistakes are small or large is of central importance in the QRE approach. A key insight of quantal response equilibrium analysis is that even if large mistakes are rare, small mistakes could be common, and their equilibrium effects must be carefully analyzed. These equilibrium effects could be large, so small mistakes in payoff space can lead to large changes in the distribution of strategies. Therefore, even if over-and underbidding in maximum-value games are mistakes, those mistakes in bidding patterns could be common and could also have a substantial influence on bidding in general. Our paper explores the extent to which this possibility can explain the empirical results in ILN.
How Predictions Change with Quantal Response Combined with Belief Based Models
This section is designed to convey three ideas. First, we explain some intuitions of how bidding in phase I depends on the change from an assumption of perfect best response behavior (as in ILN) to imperfect best response, or quantal response, behavior. Second, we explain the intuition for the effect of imperfect beliefs,à la CE and level K models, when combined with imperfect best response behavior. Third, we provide a theoretical intuition for why the treatment effects (phase II and M inBid) can be negligible under both the imperfect best response models and the imperfect belief models.
First, to convey a sense of how QRE can approximate the behavior in phase I, it is useful to consider optimal and nearly optimal responses to the bidding behavior of your opponent, under different hypotheses about his or her degree of imperfect best response behavior. Recall that in the logit version of quantal response behavior, for each possible signal x, a bidder uses a behavioral strategy where the log probability of choosing each available bid is proportional to its expected payoff, where the proportionality factor, λ, can be interpreted as a responsiveness (or rationality) parameter. In particular, we have:
where b ∈ B, the set of available bids, and U (b|x) denotes the expected utility of bidding b conditional on observing x. The key question then is how a player forms his expectations, in particular, how a bidder's beliefs about the other bidder affects the expected utility term, U (b|x).
At one extreme, if the hypothesis is that your opponent is bidding perfectly, in the sense of bidding according to the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, then you believe he will simply bid his signal. If this is the case, then underbidding by you can lead to expected losses, however overbidding any amount is also a perfect best reponse, because if you win you will never pay more than your opponent's signal, which is less than or equal to the common value! Thus, in this case, which corresponds to behavior in a quantal response equilibrium with very high values of λ, we have U (b|x) ≈ U (b |x) for all x ∈ {0, 1, ..., 10} and for all b, b ≥ x. Thus, in a quantal response equilibrium, for high levels of rationality, payoff functions are completely flat on the entire bidding space bounded below by b = x.
Next, consider the opposite extreme belief about your opponent. Suppose the hypothesis is that your opponent is bidding completely randomly, corresponding to a bidder with a responsiveness parameter of λ = 0. If this is the case, then there is no correlation between your opponent's signal and his bid, so there is in fact no possibility of a winner's curse! The expected value of the object to you, conditional on winning, is simply
. Straightforward calculations show that your optimal bid is equal to 5 for signals less than or equal to 5 and increases monotonically to 10 when your value is 10. Hence, the direct effect of quantal response behavior involves a combination of over-and underbidding, while the equilibrium effect of imperfect best responses leads to overbidding. , it pays for low-signal bidders with higher λs to overbid, since they have a chance to get a bargain on high-value items if the high-signal players underbid. Similarly, high-signal players with higher λ's bid their signals or higher because underbidding is a substantial mistake in expected payoff terms. The highest value of λ gives a piecewise linear distribution that resembles an hockey-stick.
Of course, the discussion above simplifies the intuition of quantal response equilibrium; the The effects of CE and CH complement, and in some cases reinforce, the effects of imperfect best response. With respect to CE, the easiest way to see this is to note that if λ = 0 there is no winner's curse, so imperfect best responses implies some degree of partially cursed behavior. Both effects (CE and QRE) push bids up for low signal values, and reduce to expected losses from overbidding. In level-k and CH models, Level 1 bidders behave exactly as if they are facing λ = 0, so the discussion of optimal responses is the same as described above. However, level-2 bidders who think they are playing level-1 (the level-k specification, not CH) know they are playing overbidders, and therefore they might mistakenly pay too much, so their optimal response is to bid their signal. To consider higher levels, recall that if an opponent is bidding their signal, then overbidding and bidding one's signal are both weak best-responses. Therefore, a level-3 bidder is actually expected to overbid, in a statistical sense, against a level-2 bidder. Following a similar logic, higher level players alternate from level to level between overbidding (k even) and signal-bidding (k odd). Thus, the levelk model assuming best response predicts a mixture of random bidding, overbidding, and signal-bidding, as in QRE.
What are the implications of these models of imperfect best response and imperfect beliefs for Phase II bidding behavior? In Phase II, each bidder competes against a machine player that is programmed to bid exactly according to the bidding function the bidder used in Phase 1. Because there is no feedback between phases, in our analysis we assume that the degree of responsiveness or cursedness is the same in Phase I and Phase II, but take into account that their opponent's bidding strategy is governed by a different distribution in Phase I and Phase II. What about the CE model in phase II? While the players know the bidding strategy of the computerized opponent, they must bid without knowing the signal drawn by the opponent in a specific round. Thus, one can still apply the cursed equilibrium model, where one of the players (the computer) simply has a fixed strategy. And, as in CE, there is no reason to expect a human bidder who fell prey to cursed beliefs in Phase I would necessarily have an epiphany and suddenly realize how to correctly account for the correlation between the machine bidder's signals and bids. As noted in our introduction, behavior based on cursed beliefs has been widely observed in decision experiments with human players competing against computerized rules in situations that are isomorphic to games. Thus, in Phase II, as in Phase I, cursed behavior combined with QRE could produce a relatively modest increase in the extent of overbidding relative to a pure QRE model.
Finally, consider the implications of level K models for Phase II. As ILN point out, with a perfect best response model, a level k bidder in Phase I should behave like a level k+1 bidder in Phase II. For example, if a bidder is a value bidder (k odd) in Phase I he should be an overbidder in Phase II and vice versa. This is not what one observes in the data. However, the picture changes in two interesting ways if there is quantal response. First, bidders who are level-0 or odd-level bidders in phase I (because they overbid) could be revealing a low response sensitivity λ i . For example, their (stochastic) bidding function could look like Figure  1a or 1b above. If λ i is not too large, they might respond very little to knowing that they are bidding against their own previous phase I bids. Second, bidders who bid close to their signals in phase I will be identified as candidate even-level bidders. But when they are bidding against their own previous bids in phase I (which are bids equal to signals), then bidding signals and bidding above signals are equally "best" responses. Even a little quantal response implies that these bidders may actually bid above their signals, and hence above their own previous bids.
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So the combined effect of quantal response on the analysis of the response to the phase II treatment is to dampen (depending on λ) the predicted effect of the level 1's bidding lower, and to add an effect of level 2's bidding higher. Thus, it is not clear there will be any strong effect overall in aggregate bids in the comparison of phase I to phase II. The same conclusion holds for the CH model with quantal response, which predicts identical level-1 behavior and a similar level-2 response to the phase II treatment.
Experimental Design Details
In the experiment, signals are said to be uniformly, independently, and discretely distributed from 0 to 10. Subjects make a series of bids but do not receive any feedback after each auction. In fact, each subject received each integer value exactly once; so the resulting bid function is similar to what you might get if you asked for a bid for each possible value (a.k.a. the strategy method). Payoffs are $.50 per experimental dollar. Subjects begin with $20 and received that sum plus or minus the total of all the payoffs from random matching with other bidders. Notice that it is possible to lose money, if you overbid persistently. In fact, about 27.50% of subjects lost money from their original base pay of $20 and 16.88% ended up with a negative net balance (which they did not have to pay).
In a pilot experiment, ILN allowed subjects to bid above the maximum value, up to $100, and they noticed substantial overbidding. They therefore decided to allow subjects in the main experiment to bid up to $1 million.
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10 Indeed, this shift does seem to happen: ILN classify 20 players as signal-bidders in phase I. Of those, 13 (65%) are also classified as signal-bidders in phase II, but 6 (20%) are classified as overbidders (some even bidding above the maximum value of 10).
11 The instructions and text are not crystal clear on how the maximum bids are implemented. The instructions appended to the paper do not say anything about maximum bid caps, but the paper is clear about the maximum.
Experimental Results and New Analysis

Preliminary Analysis of Experimental Data
Let's start with a look at all the overall bids.
12 Figure 2 reports the bids by signal for phase I of the Baseline and ShowBid treatments (the two treatments are pooled because the results are very similar). In the left graph, all bids are shown on a log scale (bids are between $0 and $1,000,000). To gauge the extent of overbidding, we add to this scatterplot two lines: a continuous line drawn at a level of bidding equal to the private signal received, and a dashed line signaling a bid equal to the upper bound of the common value (i.e. $10). The left graph reports all bids. The right graph, using a linear scale, truncates bids above $15 and reports only the bids between $0 and $15. The continuous line in this graph is the median bid as a function of the private signal (considering all bids).
An eye-catching feature of the Figure 2 scatterplot of all the bids is the bids which are very high (relative to the maximum object value of $10). Overall, 7.66% of bids are $100 or above, and 2.27% of the bids are exactly $1,000,000. Note that these are actual (half) US dollars (converted at $.50 per experimental dollar bid to payment)-an experimental bid of $1,000,000 therefore corresponds to a subject imagining paying $500,000 in actual dollars. These high bids are present in all sessions and treatments. We discuss them briefly in the conclusion.
Excluding bids above $15, there is substantial evidence of both underbidding at high values, and overbidding throughout (but especially for lower values). The median bids are relatively flat, at around $5, for values $0-$5, then increase monotonically for higher values (the "hockey stick" distribution). 
Model Estimation and Forecasting
HQRE Predictions
In the logit version of HQRE (Rogers, Camerer and Palfrey (2009)) each agent, at each information set, uses a behavioral strategy where the log probability of choosing each available action is proportional to its expected payoff, where the proportionality factor, λ i , can be interpreted as a responsiveness (or rationality) parameter that can vary between subjects. In particular, we have:
where a ∈ A is one of the actions available to the agent.
In the maximal value auction, when agent i receives private signal s i , his expected utility from bid b i is the following:
The first term is the probability of winning times the expected net benefit conditional on winning, while the second term is the probability of a tie times the expected net benefit conditional on tying (ties are broken randomly), and given the strategy of the other bidder. Given these expected payoffs, the choice probabilities follow from the choice rule in (1), i.e.:
An insight from Bajari and Hortacsu (2005) enables us to estimate HQRE consistently. They note that if the model is correct, then the actual data provide an unbiased estimator of the aggregate joint distribution of bids and signals -and also players' beliefs, since beliefs are assumed to be consistent with actual behavior, by the E part of the definition of QRE. Therefore, we use the empirical joint distributions of signals and bids (i.e. the distributions observed in the experiments) in phase I of the Baseline and ShowBid treatments to compute the empirical expected utility of each bid given each private signal, EU (b i |s i ). 13 Then, for each subject playing in those sessions, we estimate, using MLE, the λ i that best fits his observed bidding function. This gives us a distribution over bids (conditional on the signal) for each subject. Aggregating over all subjects, we obtain a predicted distribution of bids for each signal.
In Panel 1 of Figure 4 we show the quartiles of this distribution and we compare them with the quartiles of the observed bids (represented with boxplots). The predictions for phase II (Panel 2 of Figure 4 ) are, instead, out-of-sample predictions. For each subject, we first compute EU (b i |s i ) using the empirical joint distribution of bids and signals from his previous plays in phase I (i.e. each agent plays against his exact previous bidding function). Then, we predict his behavior in phase II by plugging in these expected payoffs and the λ i estimated for phase I into (2).
CE-QRE Predictions
An agent i who is cursed, in the sense of Eyster and Rabin (2005), correctly predicts the distribution of other players' bids, but underestimates the degree to which these bids are correlated with the other players' private signals. In particular, the expected utility of a cursed agent is given by:
The extent to which agents are cursed is parameterized by the probability χ ∈ [0, 1] they assign to other players playing their average distribution of actions irrespective of type rather than their type-contingent strategy (to which she assigns probability 1 − χ). In the maximal value game, the expected utility of a χ-cursed agent i from bidding b i when observing signal s i is given by:
We assume, moreover, that agents respond imperfectly as in a HQRE:
As in the HQRE estimation, we use the empirical joint distributions of signals and bids in phase I of the Baseline and ShowBid treatments to compute EU χ CE (b i |s i ). Then, we estimate with a standard MLE procedure the vector of individual λ i 's and the cursed parameter χ that fit the data best. To compute the out-of-sample predictions for phase II we use the same λ i 's and χ estimated for phase I but we take into account that everybody has different beliefs (based on the empirical distribution of their previous bids in phase I) and, thus, different expected payoffs. The predicted distributions for phase I are shown in Panel 1 of Figure 5 , while the out-of-sample predictions for phase II are in Panel 2 (assuming the same χ value).
Intuitively, CE generates overbidding in phase I because players ignore, to an extent calibrated by χ, the connection between the bid and signal of the other player. Therefore, bidders with low signals do not realize that a low bid indicates the other player's signal may be low, and hence overbid to take advantage of the perceived bargain.
CH-QRE Predictions
In the CH model (Camerer, Ho and Chong (2004) ) players adopt an iterative decision rule based on k steps of thinking, and assume a Poisson frequency distribution f (k) of step k players. "
Step 0" types do not assume anything about their opponents and merely choose according to a uniform probability distribution. "
Step k" players assume that their opponents are distributed, according to a normalized Poisson distribution, from step 0 to step "k − 1". Therefore, they accurately predict the relative frequencies of less sophisticated players, but ignore the possibility that some players may be as sophisticated or more.
Step 1 players assume that all the others players are step 0 players, while step 2 players assume the other players are a combination of step 0 players and (quantal responding) step 1 players. In particular, a step k player's belief (for k > 0) about the proportion of h step players is given by f k (h) = 0 for h > k − 1 and f k (h) for h < k, given by:
where f (k) = e −τ τ k /k!, which is characterized by one parameter τ > 0.
In this setting, denote the expected utility of step 1 players as EU CH 1 (b i |s i , τ ), and the one of step 2 players as EU CH 2 (b i |s i , τ ). We assume, moreover, that agents respond imperfectly as in a QRE with a homogeneous λ:
In principle, one could allow for heterogeneous λ in the CH model. However, the CH model already has built into it different types so we conjecture that allowing for heterogeneity in responsiveness would add little improvement in fit. Thus, for parsimony we estimate only a homogeneous CH-QRE model. Also, to keep the estimation simple, we only consider types k < 3. Allowing for higher levels in the estimation adds little.
For each pair (λ, τ ), (3) implies a joint distribution of bids and signals for type 1 and type 2 players (and, combining this with the random behavior of type 0 players, an aggregate distribution of bids). To generate the predictions in Panel 1 of Figure 6 , we estimate with MLE the pair ( λ, τ ) that fits best the empirical strategies from phase I of the Baseline and ShowBid treatments. For the out-of-sample predictions for phase II we use the same λ estimated for phase I and compute the corresponding QRE bidding strategies. Notice that the estimated parameter for the Poisson distribution of types, τ , has no role in phase II, as players are now bidding against their own previous bid profile rather than against a mixture of lower level players. Moreover, even if λ is the same for every agent, we take into account that each bidder has different beliefs (based on the empirical distribution of her previous bids in phase I) and, thus, different expected payoffs. We present out-of-sample predictions for phase II of the same treatments in Panel 2 of Figure 6 .
We present two sets of CH-QRE predictions for the MinBid treatment. The left-hand panel of Figure 7 shows predictions for phase I obtained by estimating ( λ, τ ) as described above. The right-hand panel of Figure 7 , instead, shows predictions for phase I of the MinBid treatment obtained using the parameters estimated with the data from phase I of the Baseline and ShowBid treatments.
General Discussion and Conclusion
The interesting empirical results originally reported by ILN in the maximum-value auction show a hockey stick-shaped pattern of overbidding: bids for signals from 0-5 are around 4-6; higher signals also exhibit modest overbidding that increases linearly with the signal. Models with heterogeneous quantal response fit these data rather well. Those models fit the central hockey-stick tendency; and they also generate approximately the right degree of variation in bids, measured by interquartile range. The fit is further improved (significantly) by weakening the assumption of equilibrium beliefs (in QRE) according to the one-added- More importantly, the estimates obtained from the phase I data fit the phase II data outof-sample about as well as they fit phase I data in-sample, and fit the MinBid treatment similarly well. This means that the treatment effects which were hypothesized by ILN based on perfect best-response models, are not hypothesized to occur under quantal response. Those hypothesized changes are not evident in the data either.
In their original analysis of these data, ILN draw a different broad conclusion than we do. The difference is substantive, not semantic, and requires a careful distinction between two different dimensions by which models may deviate from standard Nash equilibrium: perfect vs. imperfect best response; and equilibrium ("rational expectations") vs. nonequilibrum beliefs.
ILN's expressed interest in this bidding game is that some specialized perfect best-response models of nonequilibrium beliefs (CE, and level-k) predict that bids will be lower under the two experimental treatments, for certain types of bidders. The idea is that people may overbid in phase I because they do not correctly infer the connection between signals and bids (CE), or because they think they are facing random bidders (level-1). In theory, these erroneous beliefs should be erased and replaced in phase II when they bid against their own previous bid functions. The phase II treatment is therefore predicted to make their bids lower. Since, empirically, bids are not much lower in the treatment conditions, ILN conclude, "Overall, our study casts a serious doubt on theories that posit the WC is driven by beliefs."(p. 1435)
However, that conclusion must be qualified by "...assuming perfect best responses" at the end (or implicitly qualified by a reader correctly noticing that "driven by beliefs" is used as shorthand to mean nonequilibrium belief modeling with perfect best response in the definition). 15 Virtually the opposite conclusion is reached if one combines nonequilibrium belief models with quantal response. Technically, both conclusions are correct; and together they provide a full picture of what the data show about different kinds of theories. ILN's analysis shows that best response models clearly fail in this environment. 16 We show that models based on quantal response equilibrium do fit the data well, and even better when combined with nonequilibrium beliefs.
The rest of our conclusion consists of four remarks.
First, note that nothing about these data or these models necessarily guarantees a good fit for HQRE. In fact, the approximate accuracy of HQRE in fitting the overall distribution, in both baseline and treatment conditions, came as a small surprise to us. It might surprise others too. For example, while the published ILN paper (2010b) does not mention QRE at all, the penultimate draft (2010a) says: "Informally, our evidence against (a ) [noisy best response with zero median in noise] in initial periods of play in common-value auctions is probably also evidence against QRE. However, formally, given that we cannot test assumption (a ) [noisy best response], we cannot say much about QRE."
Their first sentence is not right because QRE generally does not predict zero median in noise -as this specific game beautifully illustrates. Noise around equilbrium strategies is driven by expected payoff differentials, which in this game are highly asymmetric around signal bidding; so probable evidence against a model with zero median noise could be evidence for QRE, and is certainly not clear evidence against it. Also, our paper does show one way to can "test assumption a ", by using the maintained assumption of equilibrium beliefs to justify using the data as an estimator of beliefs. An earlier working paper (ILN 2008) says more about QRE, but we do not comment further on the grounds that authors should not be held responsible for all details of early paper drafts.
Second, the maximum-value auction and associated treatments are not that useful for comparing different theories with equilibrium or nonequilibrium beliefs, under best response. All those theories are clearly rejected by the phase I behavior alone. In contrast however, the game is actually quite useful for comparing models with best response and quantal response. Best response models cannot explain the distribution of bids and lack of treatment effects, while quantal response models can. Given that best response and quantal response models are both used frequently along with nonequiibrium beliefs (as shown by the Table 1 counts) , it is handy to have a game that can sharply distinguish them.
Third, the prevalence of very high bids in these auctions is striking: 2% of $1 million; and 8% of $100 or more. In their design, a $1 million experimental bid converts to $500,000 US dollars in subject payments. These sky-high bids are evident in all sessions and treatments.
raneous study of the maximum value game in a bargaining setting.
Many of these bids are concentrated in a few individuals, but 27% of subjects (36 out of 134) make at least one bid of $100 or above, which is ten times the maximum object value. ILN do not discuss or explain these interesting high bids at all. The published paper implicitly acknowledges existence of bids above the theoretical maximum of 10, stating (footnote 32, p. 1443): "We plot median, rather than average, bids because averages are distorted by bids above 10."
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One hypothesis is that subjects were amused by the possibility of actually bidding $1 million, knowing full well they wouldn't have to pay if they lost even a small fraction of that amount.
On the other hand, such bids are far from irrational. In fact, an alternative hypothesis is that they are playing in accordance with one of the infinite number of asymmetric "bullying" Nash equilibria in which a small percentage of subjects bid above 10, and other subjects weakly best respond by bidding zero (which increases the bully's payoff). ILN note that nothing in the experimental design encourages emergence of such asymmetric equilibria 18 ; on the other hand, there is little to discourage it since there is no feedback to unlearn behavior if it is out of equilibrium.
Fourth, the maximum-value auction results provide an opportunity to reflect upon how much we demand, expect, and hope that models of human behavior can do. It is certainly the case that the winner's curse in common-value strategic auctions, and similar mistakes in singleperson decision analogues (the "Beastie Run" example from 1980's decision research, and Charness and Levin, (2009)) and common value bargaining settings (Carrillo and Palfrey, forthcoming), clearly point to a widespread failure to correctly compute -or perhaps even comprehend -conditional expectations. However, it is also true that simple models of the difficulty of computing conditional expectations (as well as CE) cannot explain deviations from equilibrium in complete information games or in Bayesian games with a private values structure. 19 An advantage of level-k and CH and QRE explanations is that they can explain anomalies in both complete information games and in private information games like the maximum value auction (as results reported here demonstrate)-because limits on the depth of strategic thinking about others automatically generate mistaken inferences about information-strategy links (cf. ). Probably the best collection of modelling tools will include quantal response (as our results in this paper suggest), level-k or CH, and some specialized account of why conditioning expectations on hypothetical events that must be imagined (even in apparently simple decisions) is so tricky. Progress beyond the useful benchmark of Nash equilibrium has been so rapid in recent years, however, that it is easy to be optimistic about making further progress on a more integrated, predictive general theory that can be tractably applied to the empirical analysis of all these types of games and decisions.
